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Will Marriage Disappear?1
FRANK F. FURSTENBERG
Zellerbach Family Professor of Sociology 
University of Pennsylvania
The origins of marriage in human history are murky. In the West, religiously sanctioned weddings were restricted to the wealthy and privileged until the Catholic Church began to rethink its 
policy of confining the sacrament of matrimony to the aristocracy and 
the propertied classes during the Renaissance. Before then, common-law 
arrangements were honored by the community, but it is difficult to 
determine just how widespread and longstanding marital bonds existed 
among commoners. The colonization of marriage by the church was an 
historical and political process that culminated in a Western model of 
matrimony that varied somewhat in form and function by place and 
over time. The timing of marriage was markedly different, for example, 
in Eastern and Western Europe. Patterns of co-residence among genera-
tions differed in Southern and Northern Europe, influencing the degree 
of autonomy permitted to young people in mate selection.
Contrary to popular belief among Americans, marriage practices have 
always been adapted to fit prevailing economic and demographic condi-
tions in particular localities; there is no distant past in which so-called 
“traditional” marriage prevailed in the Western world. Even in the United 
States, where it is sometimes claimed that a conjugal-based marriage 
system (i.e., strong emotional bonds between husband and wife) has 
existed since our founding, abundant evidence exists of regional, religious, 
and social class variations in marriage patterns from the colonial period 
onward. To take but one example, rates of premarital pregnancy have 
varied greatly depending on location and historical period.
Needless to say, this historical perspective is frequently absent in 
contemporary discussions of what is happening to marriage and, more 
broadly, the way that family life is organized today. Political observers 
from both the left and the right tend to impose a moral perspective on 
how families should operate, and discussions of changing marriage 
practices have been tinged with erroneous or partial impressions of 
both marriage past and marriage present. For example, premarital 
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chastity was widely promoted but only partially adhered to throughout 
the history of the United States.
It is irresistible, but very hazardous, to project into the future a view 
of marriage and family life based on what exists today. No sociological 
or demographic data permit us to forecast what the family will look like 
at the end of the current century. We (social scientists) must be modest in 
our ability to imagine, much less project, the future of the family. 
The central aim of the current essay is to provide an account of 
how we got from the model of the twentieth-century family that 
prevailed in the post-war era (1945–65) to the present time, when 
many observers are lamenting the changes that have taken place during 
the final third of the last century. In a matter of five decades, we have 
gone from an era when almost everyone got married and had children 
to the present when marriage has become ever more selective and child-
bearing ever more elective. As many as one-quarter of young adults 
today will never enter formal marriage and nearly that many (whether 
they marry or not) will be childless. How did this rapid and dramatic 
shift come about, and is it likely to continue in the near future?
Until the end of the nineteenth century, most Americans continued 
to work in agriculture, and the family remained a center of both 
production and reproduction. Fertility continued to be quite robust 
until the nineteenth century, when it began to decline both here and in 
virtually all Western nations. Multigenerational households were never 
a common family form in the United States, although parents and chil-
dren often co-resided for a time and often late in life. Marriage launched 
young adults into separate households, a practice that remained fairly 
standard after World War II.
During the Depression and through World War II, family formation 
was constrained first by economic conditions and later by the mobiliza-
tion of young adults. When the troops came home, there was literally a 
rush to marry, the likes of which we have not seen before or since. The 
rate of marriage soared in the aftermath of the war as couples couldn’t 
wait to walk down the aisle. The marriage rush was accompanied by 
the much heralded baby boom that produced a marked rise in the birth 
rate, which lasted almost 20 years. Throughout that period, the nuclear 
family (i.e., husband, wife, and children) was in ascendancy. Hard as it 
is to fathom today, the median age of marriage for women dropped 
from almost 26 at the beginning of the twentieth century to just over 
20 by 1957. A very high proportion of these younger brides became 
pregnant before they wed, and many younger couples struggled to 
make ends meet even in a booming economy. 
The rush into marriage and fertility put tremendous strain on 
couples, thus leading, many observers believe, to a rising rate of divorce. 
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Divorces spiked in the late 1940s because couples, especially in the 
post-war era, often divorced not long after they married, and the rate 
of divorce rose steadily and substantially from the 1950s to the late 
1970s, by which time the marriage age had begun to rise and a new 
pattern of family formation began to emerge. 
The post-war period in which the nuclear family was the dominant 
form is now recalled with considerable nostalgia by many. It is often 
referred to as “the traditional family” even though it was fairly short-
lived. The model of the family was built around the ideal of a “compan-
ionate” marriage. Two people came together, and they merged their 
interest and made a common union: the formula might be expressed as 
“1 + 1 = 1.” In certain respects, it was a very effective form of the family, 
but it was also a controlling structure because of its reliance on a sharply 
defined, gender-based division of labor. Men worked outside the home, 
and women mostly assumed a domestic role, organizing the household 
and caring for children. This pattern was upset during the war when 
many women were drawn into the labor force because of the shortage of 
prime-age male workers. In the decades immediately following the war, 
most couples resumed the pattern of a single-wage earner, who was 
almost always the male. (Nonetheless, during the two decades after the 
war, single and formerly married women, a then-increasing population, 
were generally employed, although those numbers would represent only 
a tiny fraction of today’s population of such women.) 
Looking back now with the benefit of hindsight, it is not so difficult 
to see the strains introduced by this social form, which relied on rigid 
division of labor. Beginning in the late 1950s, rising standards of 
consumption began to put pressure on families to expand their incomes 
beyond wage growth, leading more married women to enter the labor 
force after their children became of school age in that decade and the 
following one. Many women had worked for a time before they 
married and had children, but beginning in the late 1970s, more women 
began to remain in the labor force, working either full- or part-time 
even after they had children. 
The model of what social scientists call “the gender-based division 
of labor” revealed a lingering patriarchal system that encouraged the 
belief that women lacked the skills and temperament to deal with 
employment outside the home and were better suited for childcare. The 
system encouraged and sanctioned the sharply drawn division of labor 
that prevailed at the time. And, of course, the reverse was true for men, 
who were blithely dismissed as caregivers for children. To be sure, 
critics of the family system existed, such as Philip Wylie who, in his 
book Generation of Vipers, attacked the amount of control that 
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mothers exerted over their children, claiming that they suffocated the 
development of their offspring. 
It is no exaggeration to say that marriage in the 1940s and 1950s 
was propelled by sex. Couples frequently engaged in sexual relations 
before marriage, anticipating that if pregnancy occurred, they would be 
compelled to wed. One social scientist described this pattern as part of 
the courtship system. Close to one-third of all marriages were preceded 
by a pregnancy. Entering marriage via premarital pregnancy was espe-
cially true for young women. Close to one-half of all women were 
married by the age of 20 in the 1950s—men, by the age of 23. Many 
couples scarcely knew each other when they wed; the median length of 
courtship was about 6 months, an astounding fact that has all but 
disappeared from popular recollection.
Marriage had played a very important role in the transition to 
adulthood. It was partly because of the enticing goal of having sex but 
partly because of the ideal of autonomy and early adulthood. Marriage 
was the mainspring that triggered a series of transitions: leaving home, 
establishing one’s own home, and starting a family, all of which 
occurred in a very rapid manner in the 1950s. Thus, by their early 20s, 
most young men and women were adult in every sense of the word; 
they were independent earners, had moved out of their natal house-
holds, had set up their own households, and had children.
 What ultimately undermined this model of marriage and family 
formation? A number of conditions simultaneously occurring in the 
mid-1960s. A package of structural changes in the economy and demo-
graphic changes produced by the large up-tick in marriage and fertility 
after World War II, all accompanied by a rapid shift in cultural values, 
began to undermine existing family practices that had been widely 
observed in the United States and other industrialized nations. In isola-
tion, none of the structural or cultural changes occurring in the 1960s 
could have overthrown the existing family regime, but together, they 
were a powerful force that began to upset the family system as we once 
knew it. 
First, the labor market for young adults, especially those with limited 
educational attainment began to change. Manufacturing jobs moved off 
shore, and well-paying union jobs that abounded in the 1950s and 1960s 
first began to decline in the late 1960s and continued a precipitous drop 
in the following two decades, reversing the relatively good position that 
young adults occupied in the labor market following World War II. 
The expansion of education meant that employers began to expect 
higher education attainment of new recruits, leaving poor whites and 
minorities in a tenuous position when it came to finding remunerative 
employment. Young adults who were not college bound began to 
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experience difficulties finding employment, especially in the aftermath 
of the oil crisis in the early 1970s. 
As the entrance to adulthood became later, the link between sexual 
initiation and marriage was frayed. The changes in sexual practices 
were undoubtedly a consequence and a cause of the rising age of 
marriage. At the same time, the availability of reliable methods of 
contraception for women allowed young couples to engage in sex with 
the expectation that they would not become pregnant. Of course, many 
did, but after 1973 when the Supreme Court legalized abortion, there 
was another way of dealing with an unplanned pregnancy. 
Early marriage was no longer in vogue in the final decades of the 
last century. Cohabitation had always occurred, but until 1970s, it had 
been socially invisible. In the early 1970s, The New York Times 
announced that a couple at Columbia and Barnard was living together, 
heralding a new adaptation that made early marriage virtually obso-
lete. In a matter of a few short decades, cohabitation became wide-
spread both in the United States and Europe. By the end of the century, 
early marriage in this country became a rare event. Cohabitation 
permitted couples to experiment with living together without making a 
“life-long” commitment.
The breakdown of the strict gender-based division of labor occurred 
nearly as swiftly. Single women had long stayed in the labor force, 
leaving it when they married and had children. The pressures on work-
ing-class and middle-income families grew as men’s wages began to 
stagnate. In the latter decades of the last century, married women and 
women with young children gradually remained in the labor force for 
longer periods of time, producing more families with dual careers, or at 
least two full-time jobs. In the new millennium, there is growing 
evidence from time-use studies that women are cutting back on 
domestic duties, men are taking on more childcare, and the family is 
becoming more symmetrical in form and function.
These changes in the structure and meaning of marriage have led to a 
new model of marriage that is widely practiced among the highly 
educated. Marriage has become more, not less, stable in part because 
there has been an increase in homophily (i.e., like marrying like). Age 
differences between partners have dropped, and it is more likely today 
that college-educated men and women will marry each other. This 
pattern has resulted in growing marital stability among the highly 
educated. As an ideal, the new form of marriage among the 
well-educated is symmetrical. It is captured by a change in the formula 
from “1 + 1 = 1” to “1 + 1 = 3 (i.e., you, me, and us).” 
Among the least educated in the United States, the pattern is quite 
different. Although marriage remains an ideal for poor and working-class 
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couples, it is perceived as less attainable. Couples are more likely to 
remain in cohabiting unions and defer marriage until they can satisfy 
what they perceive to be the more daunting qualifications for matri-
mony—that is, regular employment and the prospect of some measure of 
economic security. Since the Great Recession of 2008, marriage rates in 
the bottom two-thirds of the population have continued to drop.  In 
effect, the United States now has a two-tiered family system. Among the 
privileged, marriage remains the bedrock of family formation. Only a 
tiny fraction of college-educated couples, now both gay and straight, will 
never marry. Most will have children only after they marry and are more 
likely to remain together than they were in past decades. Their children 
will have the advantages of growing up in a stable, economically secure, 
two-parent union
However, for the less educated—those who do not finish high 
school or stop their education at graduation—family life has become 
less stable. Couples are more likely to move from one co-habitational 
union to the next, and often children grow up in a succession of family 
arrangements. Only a minority will grow up in unions formed by 
marriage or live with the same parent figures continuously. These 
family patterns are a consequence of unstable, economic conditions 
and a poor labor market for unskilled workers. The family system is 
typically more complex because it potentially involves parents having 
to allocate scarce resources to children from past and current partner-
ships. Children, in turn, are likely to see parent figures (more likely 
their fathers) come and go. A growing percentage of children in fami-
lies with less educated parents have half-siblings, who they acquire as 
their parents form new partnerships.
This two-tiered family system is contributing to the pattern of 
growing inequality and is establishing barriers to social mobility in the 
United States. Unless a drastic change occurs in labor market prospects 
for the less educated, we are likely to witness more economic inequality 
in the immediate future. The decline of marriage, at least in the United 
States, is likely to continue without a powerful policy intervention.
Can marriage be restored in the United States for families of limited 
means? Predictions are hazardous, but it seems likely that a greater 
measure of prosperity for low- and middle-income families is required 
by either promoting economic growth to generate better paying jobs or 
changing our tax system to increase the benefits of work among those 
with low-income jobs. Unless one or the other (or both) of these 
changes occurs, marriage is not likely to make a comeback among the 
poor and near-poor.
